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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter presents an account of the origins and development of one's ability
to classify moveable entities as either animate or inanimate. The account builds
on the known abilities of young infants to find three dimensional objects and to
reason about some of their fundamental physical characteristics, for example,
that they occupy space, move as a whole, or cannot pass through each other.
This chapter also shows that motion paths are ambiguous for adults, not just
infants. A moving object is perceived as inanimate when its motion path is
consistent with Newtonian laws of motion. If the motion path violates Newtonian
principles, then animacy is perceived.
Keywords: animate, inanimate, infants, objects, motion, laws of motion, Newtonian principles

Introduction
In this chapter we present an account of the origins and development of our
ability to classify moveable entities as either animate or inanimate. The account
builds on the known abilities of young infants to find three dimensional objects
(Kellman and Spelke 1983) and to reason about some of their fundamental
physical characteristics, for example that they occupy space, move as a whole,
cannot pass through each other, etc. (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5). We argue that
infants’ abilities to find and reason about objects are complemented by skeletal
causal principles. First-causal principles lead infants to attend to and interpret
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both an object’s composition and its motion path in ways that are relevant to the
distinction between animate and inanimate objects. They do so because they
support interpretations of motion and transformation with respect to the
requisite energy sources and the material types involved in the object’s
composition and motion path.
Our account of young infants’ differential treatment of animate and inanimate
objects is fundamentally conceptual and therefore diverges from those that limit
infants’ abilities to the perceptual level. The latter class of accounts of animacy
are based on the assumption that the perceptions of particular kinds of
movements can, alone, yield veridical animate or inanimate attributions (Bassili
1976; Mandler 1992; Stewart 1984; Chapters 7 and 20 of this volume). Our
account, which focuses attention on abstract causal principles, is not unique. It
is consistent with the argument of Heider and Simmel (1944) that the motion
paths of objects and their interactions are interpreted in terms of schemata
(Goffman 1974; Hochberg 1978). Related views have been developed by Leslie,
Talmy, Spelke and her colleagues, other authors in this volume who attribute
infants’ (and beginning language learners’) interpretations of objects and/or
semantic relations to force-dynamic conceptual primitives or implicit theories
about physics.
(p.151) We favour the idea that an underlying conceptual scheme serves
infants’ selection and interpretation of inputs for several reasons. Data about
motion paths are often ambiguous. In addition, motion path information is
neither necessary nor sufficient for the correct identification and interpretation
of novel instances. Therefore perceptions about trajectories cannot be sufficient
data for the veridical identification of objects and events as animate or
inanimate. Further, since correct identifications and attributions occur even
when a novel object is static (Massey and Gelman 1988), information about the
path is not even necessary. Finally, it is not clear how a perception-only account
of the sources of infants’ abilities can explain the evidence that infants are
capable of causal interpretations of motion paths, whereas these findings are
readily explained by a theory that grants infants skeletal causal principles.
On first causal principles

Gelman (1990) proposed that attending to and learning about relevant
characteristics of animate and inanimate objects benefits from certain
processing mechanisms. These are informed by causal principles that
correspond to deep and fundamental distinctions about an object’s composition
and its sources of motion or change. Animate objects can cause themselves to
move or change; inanimate objects cannot. These differences go hand in hand
with the fact that animate objects are composed of biological matter and honour
biological principles, whereas inanimate objects are composed of non-biological
material and honour principles of inanimate causation. The cause of animate
motion and change comes from the internally controlled and channelled release
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of stored chemical energy that is characteristic of biological entities. The cause
of inanimate motion is an external force, and there is always a transfer of energy
from one object to another, or a conversion of potential to kinetic energy.
Animate motions have a quality of function (purpose). This is a direct
consequence of their governance by control mechanisms that makes it possible
for animates to respond (adjust) to environments — be they social or non-social
— and adapt to unforeseeable changes in circumstances (Gallistel 1980).
The foregoing considerations underlie Gelman’s (1990) proposal that learning
about animates and inanimates is guided by first principles regarding the energy
sources that enable the motion and change of each class of objects. The innards
principle draws attention to and interprets perceptual information about those
natural objects that move on their own; the external agent principle supports
the processing and interpretation of data about objects that move as a function
of external energy sources. In general the idea is ‘attend to information about
sources of energy and their consequences’. In this context, two points deserve
comment.
(p.152) First, we do not endow infants with a modern notion of energy, or even
any particular theory of energy. Processing mechanisms that are constrained by
the innards principle process objects and related events as if certain natural
objects have something inside that enables their own motion and change. The
principle is neutral with respect to the nature of what a child might think about
the ‘inside’ of self-propellable objects. Since the ideas about ‘insides’ vary with
the belief system of a culture (at a given place and time in history), they must be
learned as a function of experience in one’s culture. Similarly, processing
mechanisms that embody the external agent principle process events as if an
external agent contributes to the energy needed for non-biological objects to
accelerate and move/change in certain ways. However, the principles do not
carry with them a commitment to a particular account of energy or theory of
physical causality. Therefore both causal principles are neutral with respect to
the ultimate explanation systems developed about animate and inanimate
objects. As skeletal principles, they serve to render salient information that
pertains to the motion paths and the conditions that support them for animate
and inanimate objects. The external interaction principle organizes conceptualperceptual processing of information that is relevant to inanimate objects and
their motions. The innards principle organizes the conceptual-perceptual
processing of, and learning about, the characteristics of real world animate
objects.
Potential information about a source of energy includes information about the
entity itself, particularly whether it is composed of living ‘stuff and possesses
characteristics that are biological. Information about these is yoked to the
difference between the innards and external agent causal principles. Causal
principles are not applied in the abstract; they are related to the class of entities
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that interact with the principles, just as entities in other domains are related to
the principles that define the domain. Given that the material composition of an
object is closely related to the energy conditions that support its path of
movement through time and space, causal principles help render salient those
features of objects that are related to their motions. This can be expanded as
follows. Since biomechanical motions are performed only by biological entities,
learners will attend to and learn about characteristics of the objects that cooccur with and are relevant to observed motion paths. Similarly, learners will
attend to and process those details of inanimate objects that bear on the nature
of its motion path. Information about an object’s surface characteristics—its
smoothness, shape, and size—as well as its source of movement, the barriers
that it encounters, its direction with respect to the ground, and so on are all
salient. Causal principles render them salient if the observer uses motion cues to
classify novel objects and events as animate or inanimate.
(p.153) Evidence that motion paths are causally interpreted by infants

Baillargeon and her colleagues have provided evidence that infants interpret
motion paths in ways that are consistent with the external agent causal
principle. One example is the demonstration by Baillargeon et al (1985) of object
permanence in 6- to 8-month-old infants. In this experiment infants saw the
same motion path at two different times. During the habituation phase, they saw
a screen rotate towards and away from them through a 180° arc. Nothing was
behind the screen. When their interest in the moving screen declined, i.e. when
the infants habituated, the stage was set for creating the viewing conditions of
the same 180° rotating screen for a second time. To do this, the experimenter
showed infants an object placed to the left side of the screen. While infants
watched, the experimenter moved the object behind the screen and the posthabituation phase of the experiment was started. Once again the screen rotated
toward and away from the infant. On alternating trials it either traversed a novel
120° arc in its rotation or the familiar 180° arc. Given the physics of the
situation, the screen should have stopped at about the 120° position of its
rotation, but when it continued through an 180° arc (by the use of trick mirrors
and invisible doors), it contributed to the adult perception of an impossible
event, an unseen block being repeatedly crushed and uncrushed as the screen
circumscribed the arc. The event is identified as impossible by adults because
they are aware that, except in the world of spirits and ghosts, one solid object
cannot move through another. If infants are restricted to the perceptual analyses
of motion paths, they should see no difference between a 180° arc rotation
shown in both the habituation and post-habituation phases. They should
continue to be uninterested in the event, and prefer to look at the 120° event,
which generates a novel perception. However, if infants interpret the motion
paths in terms of causally relevant variables, they should treat the second
showing of the 180° event as different from the first. In fact, they attended more
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to the 180° event, leading to the conclusion that they interpreted the perceptual
information about the motion path in ways that we know are causally relevant.
A subsequent series of experiments by Baillargeon (1987) demonstrated that 7month-old infants relate the path of the rotating screen to causally relevant
characteristics, for example the height and compressibility of the object to be
hidden in the second part of the experimental paradigm discussed above. Infants
expected the rotating screen to stop sooner for the taller of two similarly shaped
objects that they saw hidden behind the screen. Similarly, given a few seconds to
manipulate a hard and a soft compressible object, they expected the screen to
stop sooner when it hid the hard object as opposed to the compressible object.
The work reported by Baillargeon and her colleagues and by Spelke and her
colleagues in this (p.154) volume (Chapters 3 4) provide evidence that even 3and 4-month-old infants attend to and interpret variables that are relevant to the
causal conditions underlying the generation of an object’s motion path in time
and space.
The Baillargeon studies offer some support for our key assumption that motion
paths are causally interpreted. As noted by Leslie and Keeble (1987), infants
shown film of a launching event behaved as if they took into account the
different mechanical roles of two moving ‘objects’, the pusher (the transmitter of
‘energy’) and the pushed (the recipient of ‘energy’). Again, the relevant data
come from the conditions that lead infants to dishabituate following a
habituation phase. In this case, two separate groups of infants watched different
pairs of events during habituation and post-habituation trials. The first group
watched a pair that consisted of a film of Michotte’s launching event (Michotte
1963) and its reversal (we denote these events 1A and 1B). The reversal was
obtained by running the film of event 1A backwards. The second group watched
a pair of events, denoted 2A and 2B, that differed from the first pair in the
following way. In event 2A, there was a half second delay between the pusher’s
reaching the pushed object and both moving on together. Since the delay
removes the causal impression of launching, there is no reason to assign causal
roles to the perceived objects. Again, the second event for the subjects in the
second group was made by running 2A backwards.
Leslie and Keeble (1987) habituated infants to an A event and then showed them
the B event, to make up what we shall call an AB pair of events. If infants could
not interpret the perception of launching with respect to causal roles, there
should have been no difference between the ways that infants in the two
conditions reacted to their respective reversals. If they could consider the
mechanical roles of the objects, then it should matter to them that event 1B
illustrated an event that was both conceptually and perceptually reversed but
event 2B was just perceptually reversed. In fact, infants in group 1 looked longer
at their reversed event than did those in group 2, a result that provides further
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support for our claim that motion paths are interpreted and that causal
principles direct attention to information about energy sources.
The foregoing reviews some of the evidence for our central claim that different
skeletal causal principles organize attention to and learning about the animateinanimate distinction. The work of Spelke and her colleagues presented in this
volume (Chapter 3), which controlled for the fact that animates and inanimates
tend to differ in size and surface characteristics, demonstrates that 7-month-old
infants know that, whereas two inanimate objects have to contact each other if a
causal event is to occur, the same is not true for two people. The authors
contrasted infants’ reactions to two pairs of videotaped displays. The inanimate
pairs of stimuli were two (p.155) objects of heights 5 and 6 feet which had
distinctive shapes and contrasting bright colours and patterns. The animate
pairs consisted of two people. In the inanimate test condition, infants watched
two events: (i) the objects moved towards each other, touched each other, and
changed direction; (ii) the objects moved towards each other, stopped briefly
before reaching the point of contact, and changed direction. In the people
condition the structure of the two events was identical with that of the inanimate
events. For example, the parallel event for the person contact condition showed
a person holding her arms up and close to her body as she brushed alongside
another person. During test conditions, infants looked reliably longer at the nocontact inanimate event; they showed no such preference in the animate event
trials. This is what one should observe if the innards and external agent causal
principles aid infants in interpreting the motion paths of animate and inanimate
objects. Converging evidence that infants interpret a given motion path
differently, depending on whether or not the object is animate, can be found in
Golinkoff and Harding (1980) and Poulin-Dubois and Schultz (1988).
Evidence that infants interpret the same motion path differently depending on
whether the path is generated by an animate or an inanimate object, is
particularly troublesome for theorists who favour non-conceptual accounts of
initial abilities to respond differently to animate and inanimate objects. For such
accounts to work, the spatiotemporal information about the motion paths should
not be ambiguous, i.e. it should not be consistent with more than one
interpretation. Otherwise, the perceptual inputs cannot lead to the correct
classification of an object or an event as animate or inanimate. In what follows
we discuss this problem in more detail and show that it is not unique to infants.

Conceptual Coherence: Not by Motion Alone
Our arguments for a conceptually based account of the early ability to
distinguish between animate and inanimate objects parallel those made against
the classical definition of concepts (Armstrong et al 1983). The characteristics of
redness and roundness are neither necessary nor sufficient identification criteria
for a tomato. Both are characteristic of apples, as well as many other objects,
and tomatoes can be yellow and oval. To deal with the problems posed by these
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examples, theorists have proposed that concepts are organized around a core
implicit theory or set of conceptual principles that function to outline the kinds
of information that are relevant to these cores (Carey 1985; Murphy and Medin
1985). These problems do not diminish in an account of concepts of animacy and
inanimacy; turning (p.156) to motion patterns as the critical sources of input
does not alleviate the problem of indeterminancy. Perceiving that something
accelerates in the absence of a source for the acceleration does not guarantee
identification of the unknown object as animate, any more than does the
perceiving of redness and roundness guarantee correct identification of an
object as a tomato.
When perceptual information is ambiguous, one way to disambiguate it is to
interpret it within a conceptual framework. The abstract causal principles serve
this function for both the infants in the above experiments and the adults in the
experiments presented in the next section. They lead one to interpret motion
paths in terms of the causal conditions of the motion. Implicit causal principles
underlie the information processing that leads to the attribution of causal
source(s). They focus processing on those aspects of the situation that are
indicative of a mechanical or biomechanical interpretation of the object and its
motions and/or the changes it undergoes in form, colour, etc. These include
clues about material composition, speed, change in direction, surface
characteristics of both the object and its environment, etc.
Animates cannot be distinguished from inanimates simply on the basis of motion
because the cues of motion, like the static cues of colour and shape, are
ambiguous. A wide range of trajectories can be interpreted as the motions of
either an animate or an inanimate object. Our general ability to keep implicit
track of the predictive validity of a cue, or combination of cues, leads to
knowledge about the kinds of motion paths that tend to go with given object
kinds. In a similar way, knowledge about the appearance of objects in each class,
the surface cues that tend to distinguish the substances of the two kinds of
objects, the environmental factors that are relevant to the motions and reactions
of the different objects, and so on is acquired. Such knowledge then functions to
help us make educated guesses about the identity of new objects and events.
However, a purely cue-driven learning account will not work. Should we discover
that our guess is contradicted when we encounter information about the
composition and movement conditions of the unknown object, we shall be quick
to update our assignment.
Implicit causal principles allow learning like the foregoing to proceed rapidly for
the same reason that any learning benefits from available mind structure. Like
all mental structures, no matter their origin, causal principles function to
combine what is just learned with what is known already. This sets the stage for
fast learning about the cues that, on average, distinguish between animate or
inanimate items. Armed with such knowledge, even very young children should
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be able to make good guesses about the category assignment of novel items.
Evidence that they can is presented later in this chapter. (For further discussion
of the parallel function between first principles and acquired structures, see
Gelman and Brenneman (1993).)
(p.157) The studies presented in the following sections buttress our position.
In the next section we show that motion paths are ambiguous for adults, not just
infants. Part of the presentation is based on analyses of some of Stewart’s
unpublished work* which is being cited in the literature in favour of perceptionfirst accounts (Mandler 1992; Chapter 20 of this volume). This section ends with
a report of studies by Durgin and Gelman that reinforce our conclusions about
the Stewart data. We then return to developmental issues. A review of preschool
children’s abilities to assign representations of objects to animate and inanimate
categories sets the stage for a discussion of the learning model.

Adult Responses to Motion Paths
Stewart reconsidered and extended

Stewart (1982, 1984) proposes that we perceive a moving object as inanimate
when its motion path is consistent with Newtonian laws of motion. If the motion
path violates Newtonian principles, then we perceive animacy. Attributions such
as intentions, desires, hunger, affection, etc. follow. To obtain evidence for her
theory, Stewart showed college students a computer-generated ball that moved
on the screen in ways that were either consistent or inconsistent with Newtonian
mechanics. Examples of these motion trajectories are shown schematically in
Fig. 6.1. Some of these are labelled with Stewart’s characterization of the
animacy cue(s) in a display (e.g. ‘Avoidance’ in Fig. 6.1(f)). All of them are
labelled with Stewart’s predictions regarding the expected perception (Animate,
Inanimate, Neutral). Figures 6.1(a) and 6.1(b) show one object colliding with
another in accord with the laws of elastic collision. Stewart predicted that these
would be perceived as inanimate events. However, she predicted that
perceptions of displays like Figs 6.1(c) and 6.1(d) would be neither animate nor
inanimate but neutral. She argued that an object moving at a constant velocity
along a straight motion path offers no information about what initiated the
motion and therefore little or no information for animacy or inanimacy.
Stewart’s work (Stewart 1982, 1984) is beginning to attract the attention of
authors who prefer models of animacy that are not initially conceptual (Mandler
1992; Chapter 20 of this volume). There are results in the work that are
consistent with Stewart’s account. However, there are some outcomes that are
not as predicted; for example individuals do not perceive (p.158) (p.159) an
object that moves along the motion path shown in Fig. 6.1(f) as animate. Further,
there are possible problems with the data analyses. Stewart assigned categorical
judgements to an interval score in some of her statistical analyses. For example
in one study subjects responded by choosing between the attributions of ‘alive
creature’, ‘non-alive object’, ‘can’t tell’ These in turn were assigned degrees of
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inanimacy scores of 0, 1, and 2 for use in parametric analyses. However, ‘nonalive’ is a predicate that has multiple meanings, including ‘dead’ which is a
predicate that can be used sensibly with animate noun phrases (Carey 1985).
Second, it is unlikely that ‘can’t tell’ lies half-way between the animate and
inanimate anchors on a psychological scale of animacy. Instead, it is possible
that a mean score of 1 masks the fact that some subjects used the animate
category and others used the inanimate category. Additionally, the requirement
that subjects classify a display into one of the conceptual categories could have
encouraged interpretations that fit within this classification scheme; if so, it is
hard to exclude the possibility that subjects interpreted what they saw to
achieve their answers.
Stewart was well aware of these
concerns. Indeed, the rating
criterion problem led her to
perform a series of unpublished
studies on the effects of
instructions. In one, she used an
open-ended response mode and
asked college students (N = 21)
to report ‘what came to mind’,
what the display ‘reminded
them of. In subsequent studies,
Stewart encouraged her
subjects to ‘see’ all the
represented objects and their
motion paths in a certain way.
In one of these studies, 10
additional students were told
that everything represented the
motion of an animate object,
generated by a person or an
animal; in another study with
yet another sample of 10,
Fig. 6.1 .
subjects were told that
everything they would see
represented the motion path of an inanimate object such as a ball. Fortunately,
the same displays were used across all three of these instruction conditions,
which we denote here the unconstrained, animate constrained, and inanimate
constrained groups. Stewart’s generosity with her data makes it possible for us
to present analyses of these, the outcome of which is a body of evidence that
illustrates the ambiguity of objects’ trajectories.
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The new Stewart studies

The subjects in the unconstrained, animate constrained, and inanimate
constrained groups saw the displays shown in Fig. 6.1. The stimuli were created
and shown on a Commodore computer. The program first painted between 0–4
orange background strips in haphazardly selected places around the outer
portions of the screen (these appear as black bars and squares in Fig. 6.1). When
this was complete a black roundish ball (one sprite in size) followed the
trajectory programmed for that trial. Sprites moved across the screen at a
constant velocity of about 1 inch per second. Accelerations either (p.160)
doubled or halved the speed of the sprite. The total duration of a display varied
from 6 to 25 seconds. Answers were recorded for later transcription. We decided
to code only the first response recorded, on the grounds that these were the
least likely to reflect interpretations (our hypothesis) as opposed to cue-driven
perceptions (the bottom-up hypothesis).
Coding

Each respondent’s first reply for each display was scored in two ways, first with
respect to the kind of object seen and then with respect to the kind of event
reported. For the object-kind, we coded whether the noun or pronoun used to
describe the ball (actually, the computer sprite) referred to an animate,
inanimate, or mechanical object (e.g. tourist, ball, and jet plane respectively). A
fourth category, other, was used when an answer was ambiguous, incomplete, or
did not fit into one of the above three categories. Examples of other answers
included graph, computer game, and skating. Skating was ambiguous because it
was not clear whether the observer was talking about a person who was skating
or just the skates. When an answer referred to a well-known inanimate event, as
when many subjects described the Michotte-like collision in Fig. 6.1(b) as ‘pool’
or ‘a pool game’, we assumed that the object was not stated owing to
conversation constraints against stating the obvious. In this case, we assumed
that had the subject referred to an object, it would be the standard one that
fitted the known game or script. In the example under discussion, this means
that our object-kind code scored the response as inanimate as opposed to other.
Codes of event-kinds were based only on the kind of motion path ascribed to the
display. In some cases, this is all that a respondent talked about, for example a
tennis ball hitting a wall. In other cases, the event was embedded in a more
complex script, for example where the curved trajectory display (Fig. 6.1(e)) led
an observer to say that someone was carrying a balloon that ‘was released’. In
the latter case, both the object-kind and the event-kind were scored as
inanimate. The fact that the perceived motion path was embedded in a causal
account is clearly of interest. However, since the latter referred to entities that
were not part of the display, to code the perceived motion path itself as animate
would be to confound issues of perception and interpretation of the display. We
shall return to the issues raised by this example.
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When we scored event-kinds, it was necessary to expand the criteria for the
other category to include complex descriptions of computer games (‘that’s an old
Pong computer game’), mathematical and scientific talk about the displays (‘a
drawing of a parabolic curve’ or ‘It looks really sticky…when it hits every wall
it’s not using the laws of physics’), comments on the displays, metaphorical
answers (‘a stable relationship’), and literal descriptions (‘It moved along a
diagonal, then it moved in another direction’).
(p.161) Use of the event-kind code for a description was usually
straightforward, as for That person is going fast’, which was classified as
animate. However, there were problem cases, particularly in data sets from the
two constrained instruction conditions. For example, one subject in the
inanimate constrained group said that the display in Fig. 6.1(m) was ‘a vacuum
cleaner doing a lousy job’, and subjects in the animate constrained group told us
about animate objects being bounced or pushed through walls after seeing
collision displays. In these cases, although the case of the noun phrase (NP) and
verb phrase (VP) do not agree, one senses that the VP encodes the intended
answer. It is as if the respondents have found a way to meet the demand
characteristics of the task and at the same time tell us what they ‘really’ saw.
Three lines of evidence supported our decision to focus on the VP when
classifying reported events as animate, inanimate, mechanical, or other. First,
verbs are often very selective about the meaning of the nouns with which they
pair (Pinker 1989; Gleitman 1990). For example, if we hear That dax is
frightened’, The zifs are walking’, or The tral is investigating’, we are inclined to
assume that the NP is animate. These facts justified our decision to accept
psychological verb phrases (ones that referred to knowledge states, volition,
desire, motivation, motivational states, emotions, perceptions, and goal-oriented
plans of action) as evidence that subjects saw an animate event, despite their
use of an inanimate NP. Therefore, although the it in ‘it knew where it wanted to
go’ and ‘It gets frightened’ was coded inanimate in the object-kind analyses, the
events in which the object participated were scored as animate.
Use of sociolinguistic devices can mitigate or exaggerate the animacy of an
agent. This can be accomplished by using the verb in the passive tense as did
the animate constraint subject who said The child was thrown’ after watching a
collision display. In addition, English speakers can use indefinite pronouns, or
‘you’ and ‘they’, in an indefinite function to depersonalize or render an agent
neutral or nondescript, for example They were pushed’. Results of this kind
(Weiner and Labov 1983) supported our decision to pay attention to the details
of verb use when coding for event-kind. See also Beedham (1987), Lamb (1991),
and Stanley (1975).
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Finally, we obtained new data to validate our reliance on the VP in order to
classify descriptions in which the class (animate, inanimate, etc.) of NP and VP
disagreed. We presented a group of introductory honours psychology students at
the University of Pennsylvania with a variant of the fill-in-the-blank task. In our
version, passages with a blank occurred in the NP. Some of these were created
by deleting the item(s) that were in conflict with the structure and semantics of
the VP. For example That is a vacuum cleaner doing a lousy job’ became That is a
------ doing a lousy job’, ‘The ball couldn‘t decide’ became The ------ couldn‘t
decide’ and The animal (p.162) is being thrown’ became The ------ is being
thrown’. Others were created by deleting material in the NP that was consistent
with the VP, for example ‘a leaf being blown around’ was rendered ‘A was blown
around’. These control sentences were included to verify our judgement that the
NP and VP classes agreed semantically and structurally.
As expected, all 21 students filled in the vacuum item with animate nouns,
including worker, janitor, student, cook, businessman, carpenter, and painter.
Similarly the original The ball couldn’t decide’ generated nothing but animate
answers, including man, boy, debater, mother, Danish Prince, judge, and jury.
The original The person was bounced off something’ was paired with nouns that
were all inanimate except one, a bird. Answers included ball, rock, golf ball,
superball, and spring. Finally, the example control sentence elicited nouns that
were referents for light objects like leaves, feathers, etc. These data were used
to check our coding assignment on the basis of the linguistic cues detailed above
or when such cues were not present because subjects had compromised the
syntactic and semantic rules of agreement.
Coding of both the object-kind and event-kind was reliable. A sample of 54 per
cent of the data was scored twice, once by one author in consultation with an
independent rater and once by another author. Agreement between raters was
obtained for 93 per cent of scored object-kinds and 92 per cent of the eventkinds. The raters continued to score the remaining protocols on their own until
all were coded. Unless noted to the contrary, the results presented below are
based on event-kind data. There are two reasons for this decision. Focus on the
event-kind analyses is probably more consistent with Stewart’s scoring
procedure; it appears that her results were based on codes that included details
regarding event descriptions. Second, as already indicated, the object-kind
answers were more likely to reflect demand characteristics. For example, when
animate constraint subjects saw the odd collision path (Fig. 6.1(e)), all but 20
per cent complied with the instructions to interpret the display as animate by
giving an animate NP but 60 per cent generated inanimate event descriptions.
Baseline considerations

The overall pattern of results from the unconstrained group are shown in Fig.
6.2. They are consistent with Stewart’s earlier reports which means that we can
treat them as a baseline against which to compare results from the groups that
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were constrained by instructions to attempt to give animate or inanimate
interpretations. In this section we ask whether the detailed pattern of results
matches the predictions made by the Stewart model. To anticipate, there are
enough departures for us to conclude that the results are better accounted for
by the kind of account that we favour.
Figure 6.2 shows the percentage of subjects who offered a given kind of (p.163)
event description for each display. The displays are arranged from bottom to top
in order of their tendency to elicit animate descriptions. Clear collision events
were seen as inanimate by most of the subjects and never elicited animate
attributions. The display that contained multiple stops and starts in the absence
of any source for these was the one most likely to elicit animate attributions. The
displays with a mid-point acceleration or paired and co-ordinated motion paths
were reasonably good inputs for animate attributions.
Although the foregoing details
of the results are all consistent
with Stewart’s account of
animacy, others are not.
Contrary to Stewart’s
prediction, the display that
traced a collision ‘avoidance’
path (Fig. 6.1(f)), i.e. did not hit
a barrier, was not particularly
seen as animate. Many of the
motion paths that violated
Fig. 6.2 .
Newtonian mechanics were
ambiguous: some subjects saw
them as inanimate and some saw them as animate. This is not what is expected
if the perception of animacy is like ‘a perceptual illusion’ (Stewart 1982) and
therefore not subject to conceptual interpretation (cf. Chapter 5). Two displays
should have been preferentially judged as animate—the one that showed an
object traversing an upwardly curved motion path (Fig. 6.1(1)) and the one that
showed the object starting to move on the screen without a causal source (Fig.
6.1(j)). However, they (p.164) elicited animacy judgements in only 25 per cent
and 20 per cent of the subjects respectively.
Some might argue that there is a way of viewing the problematic data points we
cite that will be more consistent with Stewart’s model than we allow. Perhaps
‘mechanical’ attributions are used for weaker animate percepts. The idea would
be that perceived mechanical and animate events are interchangeable; both
solve the perceptual problem of accounting for acceleration in the absence of an
external source. However, given the subjects’ use of mechanical scripts, it would
be a mistake to collapse these. Consider the data for displays where the object
started to move on the screen (Fig. 6.1(j)) or accelerated at the mid-point (Fig.
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6.1(i)). Although some observers gave mechanical attributions to a display that
should be animate, others used inanimate attributions. As can be seen in Fig. 6.2,
this tendency is particularly strong when the display object started on its own
(Fig. 6.1(j)) or stopped without slowing or contacting another object (Fig. 6.1(k)).
More generally, there is too much variability across displays in the use of
mechanical event accounts to hold that these are interchangeable with animate
attributions. These considerations, together with others presented later in this
chapter, encourage us to keep the mechanical and animate categories separate.
The evidence fits better with the conclusion that machines are in a hybrid
category of their own.
The fact that so many of the Stewart displays are best described as ambiguous is
consistent with our account. The information from a limited segment of the
motion path of a novel object is often insufficient to render an attribution. The
perceptual information is interpreted with reference to the possible causal
conditions consistent with what is observed. When a motion path is not unique to
a class of objects, we should expect more than one outcome of the interpretative
processes. For example, as our subjects showed, the perception of a particular
curving path lends itself to a wide range of causal interpretations including ‘…a
cyclist going around a corner’,‘…a balloon and the wind was blowing and it went
like this, this, like a helium balloon. It got caught up in the air’, ‘…a horse
climbing a mountain’, and ‘…some kind of magnetic ball that encountered a field
that pushed it away’.
The results from the display where there was an abrupt collision-like change in
direction even though the ball never made contact with the barrier (Fig. 6.1(f))
are particularly interesting. Contrary to Stewart’s prediction, subjects treated
this as inanimate. In our view this is what they should have done because the
trajectory does not have high validity for an ‘avoidance’ event. In avoidance
paths, it is seldom the case that the angle of incidence is equal to the angle of
reflection. This is characteristic of elastic collision events. However, the
anomalous causal information means that observers should give reasonably
novel interpretations of the event or even suggest (p.165) that they
misperceived it. In fact, many individuals either noted the fact that the ball
failed to hit the wall, appealed to invisible barriers or clear walls, or suggested
that electromagnetic forces were at work. Some asked why the ball did not hit
the barrier and one person claimed that his eyes were playing tricks on him.
Our position differs from Stewart’s in another rather subtle way. We have no
reason to treat trajectories that offer little information about the animacy or
inanimacy of an object as neutral, i.e. they will lead to descriptions that are
neither animate or inanimate. Instead, such trajectories should be particularly
ambiguous, i.e. they should encourage rich interpretations that supply
considerable detail to relate the perceptual input to a causal account. This is
what happened with the Stewart neutral displays (Fig. 6.1(c)) and 6.1(d)).
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Display 1(c) led to accounts like ‘some kind of train going along a track’, ‘A
swimmer swimming in a pool’, ‘…something going over ice…like scooting over
ice’, ‘Something rolling along in a gutter’, ‘A rabbit running along, like when you
see the horse races, and the rabbits on the fence…’, and ‘A father sending a ball
across the floor’.
These responses embed within them an account of how the seen object could
have moved at a constant velocity, either because of a tracking device,
characteristics of the surface, or a particular kind of actor in a particular kind of
setting. This is the kind of evidence that we need to conclude that the data are
not neutral—eliciting no impression, one way or another—but are instead fodder
for the causal principles, encouraging interpretation of what is perceived in
terms of the possible agents and conditions that generated the trajectory. Put
another way, this is further evidence for our belief that attributions of animacy
reflect the workings of mutually constraining perceptual and conceptual
processes. We can expand this as follows.
Individuals’ perceptions of the spatiotemporal characteristics of the motion
paths (trajectories) shown schematically in Fig. 6.1 were almost always veridical
in the unconstrained group, i.e. object-kind and event-kind attributions were
consistent with what was shown regarding the speed, acceleration, and path of
the object. However, the attributions were not based solely on these
characteristics. What was perceived was interpreted with reference to the
conditions that could cause such a trajectory, even if it meant inventing invisible
barriers, unseen tracking devices, and meanings for the rectangles and bars that
happened to be on the screen. In other words, veridical perceptions were related
to ideas about the kinds of environments in which an event could have occurred.
In turn, all this was related to causal considerations, i.e. to one’s hypotheses
about the kinds of things and conditions that could cause the trajectory in
question. Thus causal principles constrained what was perceived. Conversely,
causal interpretations were constrained by what was perceived. For example,
the (p.166) interpretative freedom given the perception of an object rapidly
traversing a path wherein the angle of incidence equals the angle of reflection
was less than the interpretative freedom allowed by an object moving at a
constant velocity. Therefore we conclude that the causal interpretation of the
data is deeply related to the input, even though what is perceived does not, on
its own, generate a perception of animacy or inanimacy. The results from the
groups whose interpretations were constrained by our instructions support
these ideas.
Constrained instructions as setting conditions

If, as Stewart suggested, the perception of animacy is akin to an illusion, then
telling someone to ‘see’ such events in another way should have no more effect
than do instructions not to see the Muller-Lyer illusion. However, if perceptions
of animacy and inanimacy are both constrained by and able to constrain causal
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reasoning about the data, there are conditions under which instructions should
alter respondents’ reports. If subjects are asked to ‘see’ a display as animate,
they should be able to do so if this interpretative set is consistent with the
constraints given by the perceptual inputs. Otherwise, they should not succeed
in meeting our request. More generally, individuals’ success with constrained
instructions should be related to the extent to which a display includes
information that is consistent with the request. Therefore individuals should find
it harder to ‘see’ motion paths that typically index collisions as being associated
with animate events. Similarly, observers should have difficulty in finding
inanimate solutions for displays with multiple accelerations. In contrast, they
should be able to find animate solutions where an object’s motion path stops in
the middle of the display, even though the baseline bias, as revealed in the
unconstrained group, is for an inanimate event. This is because the data include
information that is relevant to the abilities of inanimate objects to start and stop
themselves. Put differently, the instructions can be thought of as setting subjects
to pay attention to those aspects of a display that are relevant to a certain kind
of causal account. Subjects should follow instructions better when given displays
that contain more such features.
The top and bottom panels of Fig. 6.3 summarize the results from the inanimate
instruction and animate instruction groups respectively. As can be seen,
observers in both groups responded as expected. They were not very good at
finding acceptable animate solutions for collisions (Figs 6.1(a) and 6.1(b));
similarly, they resisted the experimenter’s request for an inanimate solution for
the display with multiple accelerations (Fig. 6.1(m)) and twinned zigzag
trajectories (Fig. 6.1(g)). Otherwise, they were rather adept at ‘seeing’ displays
in ways that met the constraints of the instructions that they received. We end
with some samples of what kinds of events (p.167) observers reported under
these experimental conditions. More importantly, they actually work; that is,
they reflect solutions that involve a combination of a veridical perception and a
causally acceptable interpretation. They illustrate our point that abstract causal
principles focus attention on information that can be related to a reasonable
causal account of an object’s movements.
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Examples of some of the
answers from the constrained
conditions help to illustrate this
point. Answers (a) and (b) were
obtained in response to the trial
during which the sprite moved
horizontally across the screen
and (p.168) seemingly stopped
on its own (Fig. 6.1(k)). As can
be seen in Fig. 6.3, this was not
a very animate display for
unconstrained subjects.
Answers (c) and (d) are
examples that satisfied the
constraints of the multiple
acceleration display (Fig.
6.1(m)) as well as the inanimate
instructions.
(a) It looks like my mum
shopping and stopping right
Fig. 6.3 .
in front of a store.
(b) That was a figure skater
that fell down.
(c) (long pause). Gosh, I don‘t know…let’s try just a windblown object.
You‘re in an area where it is swirling and stopping and changing
direction….
(d) Kind of reminded me of some sort of balls in a track that can only go
in certain….
All these examples include clear information about the causes of one or more
accelerations, despite the fact that no such information was represented in the
motion path: someone’s mother stops abruptly to look at a shop window; a
skater falls unexpectedly; a path which usually has high validity for animacy is
rendered inanimate by an unseen wind or tracking device, the kind of causal
agents that can cause erratic changes in direction. Similar features characterize
the Durgin-Gelman transcripts discussed below, even though they were obtained
with somewhat different displays that moved more slowly across the screen.
The Durgin-Gelman studies

The studies presented here support our conclusion about Stewart’s data—that
attributions of animacy reflect the operation of mutually constraining perceptual
and conceptual processes. Principles of causality direct and modulate attention
towards relevant aspects of objects and their motions. They conceptually
constrain the interpretation of novel objects such that those objects with cues
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that have high predictive validity for animacy are likely to be classified as
animate, while those with characteristic cues for inanimacy are more likely to be
given inanimate attributions. Furthermore, the ‘cues’ suggesting animacy or
inanimacy are sometimes more conceptual than perceptual (e.g. goal-directed
activity). The film recorded by Heider and Simmel (1944), which is often cited by
those favouring a direct perception account of animacy, shows a rich supporting
environment that clearly constrains answers, for it is unlikely that talk about
people chasing each other in and out of a house would be forthcoming if the
shapes were not moving in and out of a square with an opening. Interestingly,
much of the supporting role of the static environment is de-emphasized, or even
ignored, in bottom-up theoretical accounts (Bassili 1976). The present studies
were undertaken to investigate the possible interaction of a moving object and
(p.169) its environment under conditions in which interpretation is
unconstrained by perceptually available information. Our studies thus bear on
our interpretation of Stewart’s findings, and on the role of conceptual principles
that we believe are used in organizing perceptual evidence.
The Durgin-Gelman studies
have much in common with the
Stewart studies. Like Stewart,
we presented computergenerated displays of one or
two small balls (sprites) moving
on a video terminal* and, again
like Stewart, we collected both
descriptions (unconstrained)
and rating data. However, we
used a combinatorial design to
analyse the effects of various
features and we adopted a
Fig. 6.4 .
continuous rating scale of
animacy to supplement our
coding of verbal descriptions of the displays. Schematic drawings of the 64
displays are shown in Fig. 6.4. The design for the creation of these displays
called for the combination of straight or curved segments with or without
inflections to produce four types of trajectories which we label, (p.170)
according to their shape, I, V, C, and S. The four types of trajectories were
combined with combined with three variables: (a) four levels of environment
quality (none, odd, okay, or good) defined by the presence of a single grey
rectangle at some location on the screen, (b) stopping on or moving off the
screen or not remaining on the screen, and (c) number of sprites (one or two).
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Design details

Because the displays are rather similar, we decided against a full factorial
experiment. Instead, a quasi-latin-square design (Cochran and Cox 1957) was
used to present the 64 displays according to a balanced plan, which meant that
we presented subjects with a different sample of eight displays in each phase of
the experiment. Fifty-six subjects (undergraduates from the Universities of
Pennsylvania and Virginia) first gave descriptions of eight displays (phase 1).
Forty of these subjects then gave ratings of animacy to a different set of eight
displays (phase 2). Thus each of these participants saw, at most, 16 displays, and
each of the 64 individual displays was described by seven subjects and rated by
five (different) subjects.
The two-phase experiment lasted about 35–40 minutes. The first phase required
an open-ended response and therefore paralleled the Stewart unconstrained
condition. The second phase required ratings of the degree of ‘aliveness’ of the
object/event shown in each display. The description task was presented first, so
that the explicit animacy instructions of the rating scale task did not bias the
open-ended responses. By saving the rating task until last, we circumvented the
need to familiarize subjects with samples of the displays to anchor the points on
the rating scale. Subjects were alone during the study; they were run in by and
responded to a computer-generated experiment. All stimulus presentation and
data entry was subject controlled. Individuals typed their phase 1 attributions on
the computer keyboard, and ‘painted’ their phase 2 ratings (from ‘not at all’) to
Very alive’) on the screen using a mouse. The length of the bar gave us scores
that ranged from 0 to 400. The overall mean animacy rating was 158.
Some expectations

Our primary expectation was that interactions, in both senses of the word, would
be important. Animate objects can respond and adjust to their environments in
ways that are unavailable to inanimate objects. Thus, although we expected
objects moving on curved trajectories to evoke a higher animacy rating than
those moving on straight paths, we also expected that more meaningful
environments would add to the impression of animacy (by meaningful
environments we mean environments that support interpretations of a moving
object(s) interacting with its environment). However, the presence of inflections,
or changes in the direction in which the object was heading (as in the S- and Vshaped paths), was expected to (p.171) interact with the local path shape
(curvilinear or rectilinear) because the inflected straight line which formed the
V-shaped path contained information specifying a collision which was
countersuggestive of animate attributions. Moreover, we have learned from
Stewart’s data that environmental variations have little effect on attributions
given to collision-like trajectories. The V-shaped path is so characteristically
inanimate that Stewart’s observers preferred to invent environments in order to
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explain better a causal script involving collision rather than assimilate it to an
animate event involving avoidance.
Given that co-ordinated activity
is much more characteristic of
animate action principles, we
also expected that path
twinning would encourage
animate attributions and boost
animacy ratings. However, once
again we were prepared for
interactions between this
variable and others, for we
expected individuals to
integrate all information when
interpreting their perceptions.
Fig. 6.5 .
If they have perceptual inputs
that are particularly
characteristic of inanimate
events, then they might well find an inanimate causal script that is consistent
with both this information and the presence of twinning. It should be
remembered that Stewart’s subjects could assign inanimate scripts to coordinated motion paths. They did this by appealing to causal conditions like
tracking devices and transparent connectors.
(p.172)
Rating data

The effect of segment shape
(curvilinear versus rectilinear)
on the animacy ratings, which is
shown in Fig. 6.5, was
significant (F(1,39) = 170, p
0.01). The anticipated
interaction of the presence of
an inflection and segment shape
was also found (F(1,39) = 5.6, p
0.05), reflecting the fact that
the presence of an inflection
enhanced the rated animacy of
Fig. 6.6 .
the curved path but decreased
the rated animacy of the
otherwise straight path (Fig. 6.5). More important to the main hypothesis of the
study, there was a significant environmental effect (Fig. 6.6), which is reflected
in enhanced animacy ratings provided by the ‘good’ environment (F(3,37) = 3.8,
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p 0.05). Moreover, there was a significant interaction between path type and a
portion of the environment variable (F(3,37) = 5.0, p 0.05) which can best be
understood by examination of Fig. 6.6. Although the odd environment is the
same as an absence of environment for all types of path, the l- and S-shaped
paths are extremely sensitive to the relative goodness of the ‘okay’ and the
‘good’ environments. Both show a relative decline in animacy when the
environment is only ‘okay’. There were no main effects of stopping or of having
more than one object. However, there were patterns of interaction involving
these variables, which we shall discuss below.
(p.173) Free-response data

The descriptions produced during phase 2 of the experiment were coded
according to the scheme developed for the Stewart studies. As shown in Fig. 6.7,
the pattern of animate event attributions across the four kinds of trajectories are
consistent with the rating results. Observers were most likely to attribute
animate events to curved paths and inanimate events to V-shaped paths. Despite
these tendencies, all trajectories were ambiguous. Even though S-shaped paths
received more animate than other kinds of attributions, the fact remains that
some people did interpret these as evidence for an inanimate event, for example
‘Moves similar to a feather caught in the wind’ or ‘A smoke particle as seen from
above in a wind tunnel’ or ‘a falling snowflake Similarly, some observers paired
V-shaped paths with animate events, for example bird flying above a house’ or ‘A
person walking up to a building to see if it’s open. It wasn‘t so he walked away’
or ‘…a vulture flying down to the ground to get its prey’.
The fact that even the curved displays were ambiguous is consistent with an
important feature of the rating data. Although the displays in question were
judged to have reasonable cue-validity for animacy, they did not receive
particularly high animacy ratings. This is what one would expect if simple
trajectories like ours and Stewart’s do not, on their own, guarantee an animate
percept. Intermediate level ratings are consistent with our view that information
can have reasonable cue validity for animacy without being defining.
Attributions, like ratings, were influenced by the expected interaction between
kind of environment and path direction. To show this, we start with distributions
of animate and inanimate attributions for the four different environments. As
can be seen in Fig. 6.8, subjects favoured animate over inanimate interpretations
for okay and good environments. In contrast, inanimate attributions dominated,
given either an odd environment or no environment. Animate interpretations for
an object that moved in the context of an okay or good environment included ‘A
bee going into a bee hive’ or ‘A baseball player running back to the dugout’.
These are very different in character from the two animate attributions that
were assigned to the same motion path shown without an environment or with
an odd environment. In neither case do the actors move on their own: ‘Someone
riding a sled down a steep slope’ or ‘It looked like an object, for example a skier,
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headed down a steady incline’. Instead, they use an inanimate object that is
suited to the presumed inclined plane in the environment. No such crutch
appears in the attributions offered when the same motion path was set in a Good
environment. The scripts generated here always involve self-initiated goaloriented actions that interact with a particular place. These qualitative
differences are particularly interesting and help (p.174) (p.175) account for
the relationship between environment quality and event-kind attributions.

Fig. 6.7 .
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The capacity for self-generated
actions is closely related to the
ability to respond and adjust to
the environment. Hence, when
a moving object is in an
environment in which it might
come close to but avoid, enter,
etc. an object, the constellation
of information should be readily
assimilated to interpretations
that are consistent with the
innards principle. Therefore, on
average, attributions should be
Fig. 6.8 . The effects of environment on
more animate. For similar
event attributions in the Durgin-Gelman
reasons, given a path that has
Study.
good cue-validity for inanimacy,
the external agent inanimate
principle should encourage
attention to those aspects of the environment that bear on the calculation of its
speed and trajectory, for example the surfaces of an object, the medium on (in)
which it moves, its relative position with respect to the ground, its size, and its
shape. Interpretation of these inputs can proceed with a rather narrow sampling
of the environment around the path. If nothing is proximate, as in the odd and no
environment conditions, there is no reason to alter an ongoing interpretation of
the perceived information. Therefore it is not surprising that ratings of
inanimacy are more likely when there is no environment or the environment is at
a distance.
Our account of the quality of environment effect also applies to why twinned
motion paths should, on average, encourage animate ratings and (p.176)
event-kind attributions. When the environment is social, animates can respond in
kind, co-ordinate their acts with others, oppose others, and so on. Ratings
reflected an interaction between change of direction and pairing. The qualitative
effects of path number on event-kind attributions as a function of path shape are
shown in Fig. 6.9.
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Figure 6.9 shows the overall
tendency for observers to write
about animate as opposed to
inanimate events depending on
whether the display had one or
two paths and whether the path
was straight or not and changed
direction or not. Since the rate
of mechanical attributions was
comparable across conditions,
only animate and inanimate
attributions are represented in
the figure. Setting aside
Fig. 6.9 .
consideration of the S-shaped
path findings for the moment, a
common generalization can be
made about the data shown in Fig. 6.9. The single versus pair variable had the
effect of switching observers from a preference for inanimate attributions to a
preference for animate attributions. For example, although observers favoured
inanimate attributions for a single C-shaped path, they preferred animate
attributions for twinned C-shaped paths. However, as with our rating results, the
extent of the pair effect is not constant across the different path shapes. The
different pattern of answers for the straight and V-shaped paths illustrates this
point. Further, although animate attributions were favoured for both single and
paired S-shaped paths, it is important to point out that the overall (p.177) level
of animate attributions was depressed by the paired displays. Results like these
tend to exclude models that assume that cues for animacy are additive (see
Chapter 20), particularly because subjects’ comments show that the repeated
finding of interactions between variables indexes a strong tendency for
individuals to relate and interpret their percepts to causal principles.
Individuals’ attributions are full of comment about the speed, weight, size, and
surface characteristics of an object. In turn, these are placed in media (usually
invented) and related to environments that can support the observed
characteristics of the trajectories.
In summary, the characteristics of the trajectory influence the interpretation, but
they do not determine it. The interpretation of the event is generated by the
interaction between the principles that guide a causal analysis of the event and
the characteristics of the observed trajectory.

Preschool Children Can Assign Animate and Inanimate Predicates to Still
Photographs of Novel Stimuli
We have been developing the position that, on its own, simple trajectory
information is ambiguous. Such information is not sufficient for the identification
of a novel object as animate or inanimate. We turn now to another problem—
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information about the path of motion is not necessary. L. B. Smith, D. Heise, and
S. Rivera (in preparation) have shown that 12-month-old infants discriminate a
set of displays that are made by pasting together pieces of photographs of
animate material from a set of displays that are made by pasting together pieces
of inanimate material. By the time that children are 3 years old, they can reason
appropriately about unfamiliar animate and inanimate objects presented in
photographs. For example, Massey and Gelman (1988) found that 3- and 4-yearold children were able to look at photographs of novel mammalian and nonmammalian animals, statues, wheeled inanimates, and complex rigid inanimates
and correctly infer whether each could go both up and down a hill on its own.
Monochrome line drawing reproductions of some of the photographs used by
Massey and Gelman are shown in Fig. 6.10. Neither these nor any of the other
14 items could be labelled correctly by separate groups of children of the same
age. Despite the evidence that these were unfamiliar objects and despite the fact
that they were shown in a still photograph, the children performed very well.
They correctly answered that both mammalian and non-mammalian animals
could move up and down the hill by themselves, that the wheeled objects could
appear to move down but not up the hill by themselves, and that the statues and
complex rigid objects could neither go up nor down the hill on their own. It is
particularly (p.178) (p.179) interesting that the children did not attribute
animacy to the statues or simple machines, even though they were selected to
look like familiar animals or to represent objects that sometimes move on their
own. The gross shapes of the statues often resembled those of familiar humans
or animals more than did the shapes of the unfamiliar animals. Thus the children
were already attuned to subtle features of shape and surface character.
Similarly, we see that very young children do not assimilate machines to the
animate category. We now return to why we believe that machines are conceived
of as a separate hybrid category, i.e. neither animate nor inanimate.
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Massey (1988) provides
additional evidence that shifts
from one conceptual goal to
another are paired with shifts in
the kinds of object
characteristics that are treated
as relevant. To demonstrate
this, Massey compared the way
that groups of 3- and 4-year-old
children (as well as adults)
organized triads of the MasseyGelman photographs in two
different task conditions. In one
task the children were asked to
pick the two pictures that
looked most alike; in the other,
the same children were told to
pick the two that could go up a
hill by themselves. The
particular Massey-Gelman
stimuli for this study were
chosen on the basis of a sample
of adults’ perceptual similarity
ratings of them. Given the
ratings, Massey could select
appropriate experimental and
control triads, i.e. triads that
contained pairs that looked
alike but crossed the animateinanimate classification (e.g.
the echidna and statue shown in
Fig. 6.10). Massey assumed that
children would choose these
pairs during the look-alike task,
but not during the up-hill-downhill task.

Fig. 6.10 . Line drawings of some of the
photographed objects used by Massey
and Gelman (1988). Starting on the top
row and going from left to right, the
samples are a displaying lizard, an
echidna, a vessel made to look like a
mythical creature, an insect-eyed
figurine, an exercise device, and an oldfashioned two-wheeled bicycle. Massey
and Gelman did not use line drawings in
their study.

When analyzing her data, Massey asked whether the children’s choices from the
look-alike task could predict the answers on the causal task better than an
animate-inanimate rule on the causal task. She reasoned that if the up-hill
choices were based on judgements of perceptual similarity, as opposed to
considerations of an object’s animate status, children should select the two
items that looked most alike even when deciding which could (or could not) go
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up the hill on its own. This gave her a principled way of comparing the same
choices in the up-hill task with same choices in the perceptual similarity task.
Since the items within the animate and inanimate categories tended to look
more alike than unalike it is not surprising that Massey reported that the
perceptual similarity rule had some predictive validity for both adults and
children. Despite this, she found that the conceptual animacy model predicted
the causal task choices better than did the look-alike model. This was true for all
age groups. Therefore surface cues that controlled similarity judgements did not
control answers to the causal questions. More importantly for the discussion
here, since the stimuli were of static objects, it is clear that animacy decisions
can be rendered even when an object is not moving.
(p.180) Other details of the Massey-Gelman study show that the children
looked for animate-relevant information in the pictures, even if this meant
attending to minute and seemingly non-salient details. For example, they
focused on the antennae of a crustacean when explaining why it could move up a
hill, and seemed to ignore the fact that it had a large shiny surface. In contrast,
the same children stated that statues could not move because they were too
shiny! Some children even claimed that an unknown animate object could move
itself because it had legs, a rather startling claim for objects like the echidna
whose limbs were not visible in the photograph. However, ‘limbs’ per se did not
suffice for a child: statues with limbs were not able to move themselves because
they lacked ‘real’ feet, they were ‘furniture animals’, ‘pretend’, or ‘markedup’ (i.e. patterned on the surface), or they were made of the ‘wrong stuff’, be the
‘stuff metal’, wood, or plastic (Gelman 1990).
The children’s claims that statues did not have ‘real’ feet or that animals had
limbs when none were visible are consistent with the idea that the information in
the pictures was interpreted with reference to causal principles. Metal feet
cannot serve as an agent of self-initiated motion, no matter how much they
resemble what the children call ‘real’ feet. However, the capacity for selfinitiated motion is typically realized through limb action, so why not assume that
these are part of the animal in the picture, whether or not they are shown?
Kremer (1989) confirms the early salience of subtle cues in photographs for
motion-pose and type of material. When shown, one at a time, a series of pairs of
photographs of live animals and quality three-dimensional copies (Lenox
porcelains), 4-year-old children readily identify each as ‘real’ or ‘fake’. A similar
trend for 3-year-old children was mitigated by their problems with the
ambiguous terms real, fake and pretend. In an ongoing study by Gelman and
Meck that is designed to minimize such ambiguity, we are finding that even 3year-old children can systematically distinguish between a photograph of a real
and a fake (or pretend) animal.
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How should we account for the above developmental findings? We explicitly
exclude accounts that equate this early knowledge with innate knowledge. At
least in this case, this theoretical move would amount to saying that we are born
with an infinitely large list of innate perceptual detectors. Our preference is to
postulate a powerful innate engine of learning. The idea is that we benefit from
innate first principles that define the domain and drive the learning in the
domain. These principles, although skeletal in form, are at least as much
conceptual as perceptual. From the outset, the system gathers data that are
relevant to pivotal conceptual issues and/or distinctions to which no single class
of perceptual factors is an unfailing guide. In the animate-inanimate case these
conceptual issues often involve the causes of motion, but they are not restricted
to them. Causal (p.181) principles are often concerned as much with the
composition and characteristics of the objects as the energy conditions that
underlie their movements.
It follows that our account of the developmental data is that the young children’s
causal principles serve to encourage attention to, and storage of, relevant
information about animate and inanimate objects. Conceptual concerns allow
them to reach the point where they already know enough about the kinds of data
that tend, on average, to characterize animate and inanimate objects. When they
are faced with novel examples, they know enough to make surprisingly accurate
guesses on the basis of relevant perceptual features. However, it would be a
mistake to conclude from such abilities that perceptual features alone are
driving the identification and inference processes. If this were so, the children
should not have constructed non-visible elements when looking at photographs
of animals, and they should have mistakenly treated statues as if they were
animate things. Further, they should not have been able to distinguish
photographs of ‘real’ animals from photographs of porcelain reproductions.

Summary
Motion is no less ambiguous or indeterminative of ontological category than are
static features of objects. Young and mature alike must use additional resources
to achieve correct identification of novel cases of animate and inanimate objects
and events. A principled concern with the causes, or sources of the movements
of separately moveable objects, encourages us to treat as relevant those
attributes and conditions that characterize animate and inanimate objects and
their kinds of movements. In this way our conceptions and perceptions of
animate and inanimate objects work together. The more that the input supports
the related conceptual structure, the greater is the probability that the
attribution will be consistent with the input. However, when data are ambiguous
or when there are gaps in the data, we can count on our conceptual structure to
assist us.
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Machines are a particularly interesting category. Although they appear to move
on their own, they are quintessentially ambiguous. They are made of inanimate
material and do not exhibit biomechanical motions, nor do they adjust very well
to local environmental problems. Robots are not particularly good at adjusting
their motions to local perturbations in the environment; in contrast, so
predictable is the animate world’s ability to deal with unanticipated holes,
bodies of water, oil slicks, branches that come below the head, sun in the eyes,
weather changes, etc., that we almost forget how remarkable are the action
abilities of the animate world. This reflects the fact that machines do not exhibit
the kind of action that is controlled by biological mechanisms (e.g. coupled
oscillators) – action (p.182) patterns that are noted by infants (Berthental 1993)
and used as cues for animacy (Wilson 1986). Additionally, machines are made of
the wrong ‘stuff to be treated as animate. Recall that causal principles yoke
information about objects’ trajectories and their kind of ‘stuff’. If so, machines
cannot be classified as examples of one or the other ontological category. Such
considerations led us to expect that children and adults would create a new
hybrid category for representing machines. All the data presented in this
chapter are consistent with this expectation. This is yet another reason to
conclude that we cannot assign a novel object to either the animate or inanimate
category simply on the basis of information about whether we see that it moves
on its own or not.
We have challenged bottom-up models on the grounds that we believe that there
is no list of perceptually accessible features that will always tell us what is
animate and what is inanimate. The perceptual information, as informative as it
might be, is nevertheless usually ambiguous or incomplete. What determines
one’s categorization of an object is, in the end, conceptual. We have presented
data to show that this is true for both adults and young children. Ambiguity is
resolved with respect to choices of causes about objects and their motions, given
a set of conditions. If, during a trip to the desert, you came upon a round object
covered with needle-like protrusions, you probably would call it a ‘cactus’.
However, should it start to move, you would surely be relieved to find out that it
was a non-dangerous echidna and would not insist that it was a cactus because
of what it looked like initially. Like our subjects, you might even start to look for
its limbs.

Acknowledgements
Partial support for the preparation of this chapter as well as some of the
research reported here came from grants from the National Science Foundation
(BNS 89-16220 and DBS-9209741) and a University of California at Los Angeles
(UCLS) Dean’s fund to Rochel Gelman. Analyses of the Stewart data and the
follow through experiments were accomplished with funds from the same
sources as well as graduate student support from the Universities of
Pennsylvania and Virginia to Frank Durgin. We gratefully acknowledge the many
people who helped us think through and/or code the event analyses of the
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press,
2021. All Rights Reserved.

Distinguishing between animates and inanimates: not by motion alone
moving sprite experiments, especially Lisa Becker, Randy Gallistel, Nancy
Henley, Betty Meck, and Andy Su. Last and most importantly, we are indebted to
Judith Stewart who shared so much with us. We are grateful to Mary McManus
for the freehand line drawings in Fig. 6.10.
(p.183) References
Bibliography references:
Armstrong, S. L., Gleitman, L. R. and Gleitman, H. (1983). What some concepts
might not be. Cognition 13, 263–308.
Baillargeon, R. (1987). Young infants’ reasoning about the physical and spatial
properties of a hidden object. Cognitive Development 2, 179–200.
Baillargeon, R., Spelke, E. S. and Wasserman, S. (1985). Object permanence in 5month-old infants. Cognition 20, 191–208.
Bassili, J. N. (1976). Temporal and spatial contingencies in the perception of
social events. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 33, 680–5.
Beedham, C. (1987). The English passive as an aspect. Word 38, 1–12.
Berthental, B. I. (1993). Infants’ perception of biomechanical motions:
instrinsicimage and knowledge-based constraints. In Carnegie Symposium on
cognition. Visual perception and cognition in infancy (ed. C. Granrud). Erlbaum,
Hillsdale, NJ.
Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge University Press.
Cochran, W. G. and Cox, G. M. (1957). Experimental Designs. Wiley, New York.
Gallistel, C. R. (1980). From muscles to motivation. American Scientist 68, 398–
409.
Gelman, R. (1990). First principles organize attention to and learning about
relevant data: number and the animate-inanimate distinction as examples.
Cognitive Science 14, 79–106.
Gelman, R. and Brenneman, K. (1993). First principles support universal and
culture specific learning about numbers and music. In Mapping the mind
domains, culture and cognition (ed. L. Hirschfeld and S. Gelman). Cambridge
University Press.
Gleitman, L. R. (1990). The structural source of verb meaning. Language
Acquisition 1, 3–55.
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press,
2021. All Rights Reserved.

Distinguishing between animates and inanimates: not by motion alone
Golinkoff, R. M. and Harding, C. G. (1980). Infants’ expectations of the
movement potential of inanimate objects. In International Conference on Infant
Studies, New Haven, CT.
Heider, F. and Simmel, M. (1944). An experimental study of apparent behavior.
American Journal of Psychology 57, 243–59.
Hochberg, J. (1978). Perception (3rd edn). Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Kellman, P. and Spelke, E. (1983). Perception of partly occluded objects in
infancy. Cognitive Psychology 15, 483–524.
Kremer, K. (1989). Preschoolers can distinguish between representations of fake
and real animals. Unpublished Master‘s Thesis, University of California at Los
Angeles.
Lamb, S. (1991). Acts without agents: an analysis of linguistic avoidance in
journal articles on men who batter women. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry
61, 250–7.
Leslie, A. and Keeble, S. (1987). Do six-month-olds perceive causality. Cognition
25, 265–88.
Mandler, J. M. (1992). How to build a baby II. Conceptual primitives.
Psychological Review 99, 587–604.
Massey, C. (1988). The development of the animate-inanimate distinction in
preschoolers. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Pennsylvania.
(p.184) Massey, C. and Gelman, R. (1988). Preschoolers decide whether
pictured unfamiliar objects can move themselves. Developmental Psychology 24,
307–17.
Michotte, A. (1963). The perception of causality. Methuen, London.
Murphy, G. L. and Medin, D. L. (1985). The role of theories in conceptual
coherence. Psychological Review 92, 289–316.
Pinker, S. (1989). The learnability of argument structure. MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA.
Poulin-Dubois, D. and Schultz, T. R. (1988). The development of the
understanding of human behavior: from agency to intentionality. Developing
theories of mind (ed. J. W. Astington, P. L. Harris, and S. Warren) Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press,
2021. All Rights Reserved.

Distinguishing between animates and inanimates: not by motion alone
Smith, L. B., Heise, D. and Rivera, S. (in preparation). Surface gradients in 12month-olds’ discrimination of animals versus vehicles. Unpublished MS, Indiana
University, Bloomington, IN.
Stanley, J. P. (1975). Passive motivation. Foundations of Language 13, 25–39.
Stewart, J. A. (1982). Perception of animacy. Unpublished Dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania.
Stewart, J. (1984). Object motion and the perception of animacy. Presented at
the meeting of the Psychonomic Society, San Antonio, TX, November 1984.
Weiner, E. J. and Labov, W. (1983). Constraints on the agentless passive. Journal
of Linguistics 19, 29–58.
Wilson, N. J. (1986). An implementation and perceptual test of a principled
model of biological motion. Unpublished masters’ thesis, University of
Pennsylvania.
Notes:

(*) We thank Judith Stewart for providing us with such full access to her
unpublished data and writings.
(*) Our displays were produced and displayed on a Macintosh SE with a frameby-frame sprite program Videoworks II® synchronized with the screen refresh
using a Videoworks Accelerator® and presented by means of a HyperCard®
interface.
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